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NOTE DE L’ÉDITEUR
Translated from the French original by Peter Brown
1 This work is a reponse to the pamphlet Tibet in a Hundred Questions and Answers (Peking,
Beijing Information, 1988, 124 p.), distributed in China for foreigners, whose aim was to
show that Tibet has belonged to China ever since the thriteenth century. Le Tibet est-il
chinois? (Is Tibet Chinese?) is set out in a fashion similar to the work that it challenges.
It takes up the series of questions and answers, organising them in nine sections (the
historical facts;  the issue of human rights;  the policies towards the Dalai Lama; the
issue of demography; religious beliefs; culture and education; economic development;
living conditions; the Lhasa riots), and in so doing proposes a scientific response. The
work is divided into two distinct parts, one on the history of Tibet, the other on the
current situation.
2 The historical part is based on the Tibetan military might from the seventh to the ninth
centuries, a consideration of the supposed dates Tibet first belonged to China, and the
Tibetan definition of international relations, including Sino-Tibetan relations. This part
ends with a refutation of the arguments used by the Chinese to justify their invasion of
Tibet and a reminder of the 1959 Tibetan uprising.
3 The Tibetan empire of the seventh to ninth centuries is described as a powerful state
whose agressive kings expanded their territory overseas and received embassies from
China, the Arab world and various Turkish states. Later, in the thirteenth century, the
Tibetans came under the rule of the Mongol empire that settled in Lhasa. We learn,
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however,  that  the  Chinese  view,  according  to  which the  Mongols  of  the  Yuan,  the
conquerors  of  China,  considered  themselves  Chinese  and  set  up  their  empire  as  a
Chinese one, cannot be sustained. Finally, the dynastic history of the Yuan (1271-1368)
and, later,  that of the Ming (1368-1644) excluded Tibet from the territory of China,
hence the difficulty for the Chinese sources to agree on the date at which Tibet became
a part of China under the Mongol dynasty of the Yuan.
4 During the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911), it seems that, beginning in 1721, the Manchurians
gradually  incorporated  Tibet  within  the  Chinese  political  system,  in  particular  by
establishing  a  military  garrison  and an  embassy  in  Lhasa,  and  participating  in  the
setting  up  of  new  Tibetan  administrations.  However,  the  influence  of  the  Qing
diminished in Tibet throughout the nineteenth century. During the Qing dynasty, the
chapelain-donor relationship was in full swing. This relationship was established at all
levels of Tibetan society and, from a Tibetan point of view, also determined political
relations.  The  Tibetan  masters  acted  as  spirituel  masters,  while  the  Manchurian
emperors were the providers. The Manchurians brought military protection to a Tibet
that had no army and gifts enabled Buddhism to flourish. The Manchurians played on
this relationship in order to establish a de facto protectorate over Tibet, as, from their
viewpoint, Tibet was part of their empire.
5 Finally, the British domination in India and the growing interest of the British in Tibet
changed  the  traditional  politico-religious  balance  that  had  determined  relations
between China and Tibet up to the beginning of the twentieth century. Between 1913
and 1950, Tibet enjoyed independence with absolute power over both its internal and
external affairs. In 1950, the expansionist and unificatory desires of Communist China
were at the root of the Chinese occupation of Tibet. In fact, the Chinese justification for
invading Tibet in 1950, particularly that according to which the Tibetans themselves
allegedly asked to be freed from foreign influences, is refuted. This part concludes with
an anlaysis of the 1959 Tibetan uprising, brought about by the Chinese occupation of
Tibet.
6 The second part of the work is an account of the contemporary situation in Tibet. To
the Chinese argument according to which Tibetan society has evolved towards one of
greater equality and justice, Western scholars reply with facts. The Chinese feel that
Tibet  was  feudal  and  repressive.  However,  while  Tibetans  share  the  view  that
traditional society was inequitable, there is little evidence of any oppression. Again,
according to  the  Chinese,  Buddhism is  flourishing in  Tibet,  although some Chinese
political accounts and texts would appear to show the opposite.
7 The Lhasa riots and the motivations of the demonstrators are also significant. Some one
hundred and fifty peaceful demonstrations were put down by force between 1987 and
1996. The introduction of martial law in Lhasa in 1989 remains the most repressive
measure  imposed  by  the  Chinese  in  Tibet,  whose  residents  are  the  victims  of
imprisonment and suspicious murders. The Chinese accuse the Tibetan government in
exile of being behind the disturbances. Robbie Barnett explains that we cannot expect
the existence of the Dalai Lama in exile to represent for Tibetans a lasting possibility
for regaining their national identity in one form or another. It is difficult to claim that
such an aspiration to independence is merely the result of a conspiracy or an articifial
provocation by those living in exile. He also informs us of the terms used by the Tibetan
demonstrandum to define their objectives: they wanted to be free of Chinese law and to
enable the return of the Dalai Lama.
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8 Questions remain, however, to which it is not easy to provide any answer, such as the
issue  of  demography.  The  Chinese,  like  the  Tibetans  themselves,  play  on  the
uncertainty of Tibet's borders (according to whether the Tibetan provinces of Amdo
and Kham are included or not in the statistics) and censuses. 
9 Finally, the treatment of the subjects of culture and the economy, for example, offer
another view of Tibetan society. The author shows its development and its opening up
at the same time as regretting the obliteration of traditional Tibetan culture.
10 Any  reader  keen  to  get  an  idea  of  the  history  of  Tibet  will  be  gratified  to  find  a
historical analysis and understanding of a great number of subjects, as a counterpoint
to the Chinese rhetoric and propaganda about Tibet. Western reactions to the Chinese
questions and answers are level-headed and well presented. They form a homogenous
whole that reveals little known aspects of Tibetan society, both past and present.
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